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Synopsis
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE




This synopsis of developments in the immigration laws of the
United States will focus on the few areas of the law in which
there were significant developments from October, 1979 through
September, 1980. In addition to summaries of major judicial deci-
sions and administrative actions, the discussion will include a re-
view of recently enacted legislation, regulations promulgated
pursuant thereto, and a summary of significant proposed legisla-
tion.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
Since October of 1979, the Supreme Court has decided one
case' and granted certiorari in two others 2 in the area of immigra-
tion law. The Court denied review of cases in various areas of im-
migration law which nevertheless are significant.3
1. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) rev'g 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978).
2. Fedorenko v. United States, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 444
U.S. 1070 (1980); United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted,
100 S. Ct. 2983 (1980).
3. For a summary of the 13 circuit court decisions which were denied review,
and the five decisions for which petitions are pending, see 57 INTEPmRETER RE-
LEASES 419-22 (1980).
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In Vance v. Terrazas,4 the Court, in a 5-4 decision, sustained the
validity of section 349(c) 5 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) requiring proof of expatriation by a preponderance of the
evidence rather than by the higher standard of clear, convincing
and unequivocal evidence. The Court- also found valid the provi-
sion of section 349(c) which creates a rebuttable presumption
that the expatriating act was voluntarily performed.
The Terrazas case involved a man who, having been born in the
United States to a Mexican father, had dual citizenship. While at-
tending school in Mexico, Terrazas executed an application for a
certificate of Mexican nationality wherein he swore allegiance to
Mexico and expressly renounced his United States citizenship.
After the Department of State issued a certificate of loss of na-
tionality, Terrazas brought suit in the district court against the
Secretary of State for a declaration of his United States citizen-
ship.6 The district court upheld the evidentiary standard set forth
in section 349(c) of the INA and found that the government had
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Terrazas had
knowingly and voluntarily renounced his allegiance to the United
States.7 The district court also concluded that Terrazas's evi-
dence was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of voluntari-
ness in section 349(c). 8
Relying on Afroyim v. Rusk,9 the Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court and held that the government had to prove both the
taking of the oath of allegiance to a foreign state and the intent to
renounce United States citizenship by clear, convincing and une-
quivocal evidence.' 0 The appellate court reasoned that Congress
had no power to legislate the lesser evidentiary standard under
section 349(c) because the citizenship clause of the fourteenth
amendment required proof by clear, convincing and unequivocal
evidence."1
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and re-
manded the case. The Court concluded that the preponderence of
4. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976).
6. 444 U.S. at 255.
7. Id. at 257.
8. Id.
9. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). The Afroyim case held unconstitutional 8 U.S.C.
1481(a) (5) (1976) which made voting in a political election of a foreign state an ex-
patriating act. In so holding, the court reasoned that the fourteenth amendment
protects every United States citizen against congressional forcible destruction of
his citizenship. Id. at 268.
10. 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978). See Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Immi-
gration Laws of the United States 1978-1979, 17 SAN DiNGo L. REV. 173, 181 (1979).
11. 577 F.2d at 10-12.
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the evidence standard of proof provided by Congress in section
349(c) did not violate either the citizenship clause of the four-
teenth amendment or the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.12 The Court noted that expatriation proceedings are civil in
nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty.13 Since expatriation
requires proof of both a voluntary act of expatriation and an in-
tent to renounce citizenship, Congress did not exceed its powers
by requiring proof of an intentional act by a preponderence of the
evidence. 14 The Court viewed this standard as a sufficient protec-
tion for the interest of the individual in retaining his citizenship.
In addition, the Court found no reason why Congress lacks
power to legislate the rebuttable presumption of voluntariness
prescribed by section 349(c).15 The presumption is in accord with
the ordinary rule that duress is a matter of affirmative defense
which must be proved by the party claiming it. However, even
though there is a presumption of voluntary performance of the act
of expatriation, the commission of the act does not give rise to a
presumption that it was performed with the intent to relinquish
United States citizenship. This second element must be proved
independently by the party claiming expatriation by a preponder-
ence of the evidence.l6
In its 1980-81 term, the Supreme Court will review the decision
in United States v. Fedorenko.17 In that case, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed a district court decision that held that an immigrant who
had procured his naturalization by concealing the fact that he had
served as a concentration camp guard during World War II had
not made a "material misrepresentation" as defined by the
Supreme Court in Chaunt v. United States'8 and was therefore
not subject to denaturalization. The Fifth Circuit held that the
district court had misconstrued the Chaunt test of "materiality"
and concluded that the test had been satisfied.19 The case was re-
manded to the district court with directions to cancel the immi-
12. 444 U.S. at 266.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 267.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 268.
17. 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980). For a more
comprehensive analysis see Synopsis, Recent Developments in the Immigration
Laws of the United States 1978-1979, 17 SAN DIEao REV. 173, 185 (1979).
18. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
19. 597 F.2d at 951.
grant's certificate of naturalization. 20
The Supreme Court is also scheduled to review United States v.
Cortez,2 1 in which the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court judg-
ment which convicted two individuals of knowingly transporting
illegal aliens in violation of section 274(a) (2) of the INA.22 The
convictions were reversed on the ground that the evidence used
against the defendants was the product of an illegal vehicle stop
by border patrol officers and should have been suppressed.23 The
Ninth Circuit found that, since the vehicle stop was solely the
product of a profile and not specific facts associated with the de-
fendants' behavior or appearance of the vehicle, the officers did
not have a valid basis for singling out the vehicle as a carrier of
illegal aliens.24 Thus, stopping the vehicle was a violation of the
defendants' rights under the fourth amendment.25
EXPATRIATION AND NATIONALITY
In addition to Vance v. Terrazas,26 there was one other notewor-
thy expatriation case heard in the past year. In Davis v. INS,27
the District Court for the District of Columbia held that a native
and citizen of the United States who voluntarily signed an oath of
renunciation of United States nationality at the American Em-
bassy in Paris could not enter the United States without proper
alien documents. Petitioner argued that there was sufficient am-
biguity in his statements submitted to the United States Embassy
to preclude renunciation of citizenship.28 The court concluded,
however, that petitioner's statement that he could no longer re-
main solely loyal to the United States was not ambiguous and
showed a clear intent to renounce United States citizenship.2 9
Moreover, the court found that petitioner's renunciation was vol-
untary.30 Thus, the petitioner no longer qualified as a United
States citizen. 31
Petitioner argued further that renunciation of citizenship re-
quires acquisition of another nationality,32 but the court read sec-
20. Id. at 954.
21. 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 2983 (1980).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2) (1976).
23. 595 F.2d at 506.
24. Id. at 508.
25. Id.
26. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
27. 481 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C. 1979).
28. Id. at 1180.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1181.
31. Id. at 1182.
32. Id. at 1180.
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tion 349(a) of the INA 33 as creating two separate methods for
losing nationality: one may lose nationality either by acquiring a
foreign nationality or by renouncing United States nationality.3 4
The court therefore concluded that petitioner was an alien and
must accordingly possess a proper entry document before enter-
ing the United States. 35
REFUGEES AND ASYLUM
Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act of 198036 (Refugee Act), enacted on March 17,
1980, provides a comprehensive procedure for the admission and
resettlement in the United States of refugees of "special humani-
tarian concern"37 and accomplishes three major objectives. Those
objectives include a revised definition of the term refugee, new
quotas and procedures for the admission of refugees and granting
of political asylum, and new resettlement procedures. A sum-
mary of the major provisions of the Refugee Act follows.
First, the prior definition of "refugee" has been expanded to
conform to the United Nations Protocol relating to the status of
refugees.38 In addition to race, religion and political opinion, the
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1), (5) (1976 and Supp. II 1978) provide in pertinent part
as follows:
(a) From and after the effective date of this chapter a person who is a
national of the United States Whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose
his nationality by -
(1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state upon his own application
;or
(5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or
consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as
may be prescribed by the Secretary of State ....
34. 481 F. Supp. at 1182.
35. Id. at 1183.
36. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). For the interim
regulations relating to the refugee and asylum procedures promulgated under the
new act, see 45 Fed. Reg. 37392 (1980) (to be codified in 8 C.F.R. §§ 207-209, 245).
37. Id. § 101(b). No definition of "special humanitarian concern" appears in
the statute. However, both the House and Senate Reports provide the following
guidelines: the plight of the refugees, the pattern of human rights violations in the
country of origin, family ties, historical, cultural or religious ties, the likelihood of
finding sanctuary elsewhere, and previous contact with the United States Govern-
ment. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979); S. REP. No. 96-608, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1979).
38. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees assures eq-
uitable treatment to anyone who, owing to persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is unable
bases for a refugee's fear of persecution now include nationality
and membership in a particular social group.3 9 The term "refu-
gee" does not include any person who has participated in the per-
secution of another.40 While the term "refugee" refers to an
individual outside the country of his nationality or habitual resi-
dence,41 the Refugee Act allows the President, under special cir-
cumstances, to give refugee treatment to an alien who is still
within the country of his nationality or habitual residence.42 In
any event, the term "refugee" as referred to in both section
101(a) (42) of the INA and section 207 of the new Refugee Act
means an alien who is outside the United States.
The second major section of the Refugee Act concerns the ad-
mission of refugees and granting of political asylum.43 The an-
nual worldwide limitation on visa numbers has been reduced
from 290,000 to 270,000 exclusive of refugees and their immediate
relatives.44 Section 203 (a) (7) of the INA governing refugee admis-
sion under the seventh preference 45 has been repealed by the
Refugee Act, and the six percent of visa numbers formerly allot-
ted to it have been added to the allotment for the second prefer-
ence, increasing it to twenty-six percent.46 The new law provides
for the annual admission of 50,000 "normal flow" refugees for the
years 1980 through 1982.47 The law also provides for an additional
number if a greater need is projected by the President after ap-
propriate consultation48 at the beginning of each fiscal year.49 Af-
or unwilling to return to his or her country of nationality or residence. Although
the United States endorsed the United Nations Protocol by signing it in 1968, the
broad United Nations Protocol definition of refugee was inconsistent with
§ 203(a) (7) of the INA which limited refugee status to aliens from Communist or
Communist dominated countries. The new Act resolves this inconsistency. H.R.
REP. No. 96-781, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980).
39. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
40. Id.
41. Section 207(c) (1) of the new Act states that the alien must not have reset-
tled in any foreign country.
42. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
43. Id. §§ 207, 208.
44. Id. § 203(a).
45. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1980) immigrant visas are allo-
cated in categories of preference priority. Under former law, the seventh prefer-
ence was reserved for refugee admission. The second preference, both in the past
and at the present, governs the admission of immigrants who are the spouses or
unmarried sons or daughters of an alien admitted for permanent residence.
46. Section 203(a) (7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West Supp. 1980) was repealed as well
as §§ 203(f), (g) and (h), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970) providing for adjustment of status
thereunder.
47. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, § 207(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980). This
figure is over and above the worldwide quota.
48. Section 207(e) of the new Refugee Act defines "appropriate consultation"
as "discussions in person by designated Cabinet-level representatives of the Presi-
dent with members of the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives to review the refugee situation."
49. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, § 207(a), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
112
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ter 1982, the number of yearly admissions is to be determined
entirely through consultation 0 at the start of each fiscal year.51
Finally, the new law provides for an emergency refugee situation
not anticipated at the start of the fiscal year whereby refugees can
be admitted after appropriate consultation for a period not ex-
ceeding twelve months.52
While the term "refugee" refers to an alien applying for admis-
sion to the United States from another country, the term "asy-
lum" refers to an alien who is inside the United States or
applying for admission at a land border or port of entry.5 3 To
qualify, the asylum applicant must satisfy the attorney general
that he or she is a refugee within the meaning of section
101(a) (42) (A).54 If asylum is granted, it is granted for a period of
one year with a possibility of renewal at the end of that year if
political conditions in the alien's home country remain the same.
A spouse or child of an alien admitted under either the refugee
or asylum procedures is entitled to the same status as the alien.55
This rule applies even if the spouse or child is not independently
eligible for refugee or asylum status.5 6 The spouse or child, how-
ever, must accompany the refugee or asylee or follow and join in
the United States.57
Section 243(h) of the INA, which provides for withholding of de-
portation when the attorney general believes an alien would be
persecuted if deported, has been amended. 58 The basis for fear of
persecution under this section now includes nationality and mem-
bership in a particular social group. Moreover, withholding of de-
portation is now mandatory whenever an alien can show that his
life or freedom would be threatened, as opposed to the showing
under former law that he would be subject to persecution. Even
when an alien can make such a showing, however, the statute sets
forth four specific instances in which relief may not be granted:
the alien's persecution of another, his conviction of a serious
50. See note 48 supra.
51. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-212, § 207(a) (2), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
52. Id. § 207(b).
53. Id. § 208.
54. Id.
55. Id. §§ 207(c) (2), 208(c).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 203(e).
crime, the commission by him of a serious nonpolitical crime
outside the United States, and danger to the security of the
United States. By virtue of title 8, section 208.8 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, these exceptions are made applicable to individ-
uals seeking asylum.
The new Refugee Act restricts the authority of the attorney
general to exercise the parole power contained in section
212(d) (5) of the INA59 The attorney general may not parole into
the United States an alien who is a refugee unless it is deter-
mined that compelling reasons militate in favor of paroling the
refugee, instead of admitting the refugee under section 207 of the
Refugee Act.
Aliens admitted as refugees under section 207 or granted asy-
lum under section 208 are not given the status of lawful perma-
nent residents immediately. Refugees are allowed to adjust their
status after one year of physical presence in the United States.60
The refugee "visa allocation" is determined at the time of the ref-
ugee's original entry, and there is no further quota or numerical
limitation when the time comes for the refugee to apply for per-
manent residence status.61 Permanent residence is recorded ret-
roactively as of the date of original entrance to the United States.
In contrast, asylees are allowed to adjust their status one year
after the grant of asylum.62 The Refugee Act only provides for the
potential allocation of up to 5,000 visas for asylees applying to ad-
just status. Both refugees and asylees seeking to adjust status
are subject to the exclusions to admissibility set forth in section
212(a) of the INA. The exclusions in paragraphs 14, 15, 20, 21, 25
and 32 of section 212(a), however, are not applicable to refugees
and asylees seeking adjustment. 63 Moreover, the attorney general
may waive most of the other exclusion provisions for humanita-
rian purposes.
The third major section of the Refugee Act concerns the reset-
tlement of aliens granted asylum or admitted to the United States
as refugees. This portion of the Refugee Act provides for the
presidential appointment of a United States Coordinator for Refu-
gee Affairs having the rank of Ambassador at Large.64 The Coor-
59. Id. § 203(f).
60. Id. § 209. Although not stated in the Act or in the Joint Explanatory State-
ment of the Conference Report, the Conferees intended that § 245(c) not apply to
adjustments of status under the new Refugee Act. See 126 CONG. REC. S1754
(daily ed. Feb. 26, 1980) (statement by Sen. Kennedy).
61. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 209(a) (2), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
62. Id. § 209(b).
63. Id. § 209(c).
64. Id. § 301(a).
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dinator will be responsible for policy formulation, budget
development, and coordination between agencies on a national
and international level.65 The Refugee Act also creates an office
of Refugee Resettlement in the Department of Health and Human
Services which is responsible for channeling assistance to refu-
gees. 66 The director of this office, to be appointed by the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services, will be responsible for
funding and administering most of the programs of the federal
government under the guidance of the United States Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs.67 The Secretary of State has administrative
authority over the refugee programs through 1981, at which time
administrative authority is to be transferred to the Director of the
Office of Refugee Resettlement. 68 In the interim, the President is
to initiate a study to determine which agency is best suited to ad-
minister the program. The results are to be reported to Congress
before March 1, 1981.69
In In re Rodriguez,70 the first case to fall within the ambit of the
new Refugee Act, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was
called upon to define the meaning of "serious nonpolitical crime"
referred to in amended section 243(h).71 Under this section, an
alien requesting asylum may be excluded from the United States
if he has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
United States prior to his arrival.
At an exclusion hearing, Rodriguez admitted that he had been
arrested and convicted of robbery in Cuba. To determine whether
the robbery conviction was a serious nonpolitical crime, the
Board applied a balancing test, weighing the nature of the offense
against the degree of persecution to be suffered by the alien if re-
turned to his country of origin.7 2 Taking into account the nature
of the crime of robbery and the sentence imposed, the Board
65. Id. § 301(b).
66. Id. § 411.
67. Id. Provision has been made for a three year reimbursement period for di-
rect cash and medical assistance provided by states to newly arrived refugees and
asylees. Id. § 412(e). An annual sum of $200,000 has been appropriated for refugee
supportive services for the fiscal years 1980 through 1981. Id. § 414.
68. Id. § 412(b).
69. Id.
70. I.D. No. 2815 (1980).
71. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 960-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
72. I.D. No. 2815 (1980). The Board was unable to locate anything in the 1980
Refugee Act to assist in defining the phrase "serious nonpolitical crime," so it re-
lied on a balancing test set forth in Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for De-
viewed the crime as serious. In addition, they found the evidence
supporting the alien's claim of persecution insufficient. Rodri-
guez, therefore, was not given asylum.73
Cuban-Haitian Entrants
In a policy statement issued on June 20, 1980, Victor Palmieri,
United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, announced the ad-
ministration's belief that the sudden massive influx of Cubans
and Haitians into the United States in the spring of 1980 created a
situation not contemplated by the new Refugee Act of 1980.74 The
announcement sets forth President Carter's decision to seek spe-
cial legislation for the Cuban-Haitian entrants.
In accordance with the administration's position, the Cuban-
Haitian Entrant Status Bill was introduced in Congress on Au-
gust 5, 1980.75 The purpose of the proposed legislation is to re-
solve the problem of the refugee influx quickly and humanely.
The proposal creates a special Cuban-Haitian Entrant status
available to Cubans who arrived in the United States after April
20 and before June 20, 1980, and to Haitians who were involved in
INS proceedings before June 20, 1980. Cuban-Haitian entrant sta-
tus will also be extended to identifiable Haitians who arrived in
Florida prior to June 20, 1980, but whose presence in the United
States is not currently known to the INS.
Under the proposed legislation, the attorney general is author-
ized to deny or terminate the Cuban-Haitian status of any alien
who is excludable under the INA, with certain exceptions. For
aliens allowed to remain in the United States, the legislation gives
the attorney general power to grant them authorization to engage
in employment. The proposed legislation repeals the Cuban Ref-
ugee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, and special entrants
are allowed to adjust their status after two years. Such admis-
sions do not count against the annual numerical limitation set
ternining Refugee Status (Sept. 1979) published by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Id. at 6-8.
73. Id. at 9.
74. UNrrED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, Current Policy No. 193, Cuban-Haitian Ar-
rivals in U.S., June 20, 1980. For a discussion of the new policy see 57 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 312 (1980). Approximately 114,000 Cubans arrived in Florida between
April and June of 1980. Moreover, in recent years, Florida has become an entry
point for thousands of Haitian "boat people." Id.
75, S. 3013, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REC. 10825 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1980).
Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has in-
dependently submitted a proposed amendment to the legislation that would treat
the Cubans and Haitians in the same manner as they would be treated under the
Refugee Act of 1980. The Kennedy amendment would also repeal the Cuban Refu-
gee Adjustment Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L No. 89-732. 126 CONG. REC. 10825
(daily ed. Aug. 5, 1980).
[VOL. 18: 107, 1980] Synopsis
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
forth in the INA. The proposed legislation also provides for fed-
eral reimbursement to states that provide assistance and services
to Cuban-Haitian entrants.
Haitian and Cuban Litigation
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti,76 the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida overturned the procedures under
which asylum claims by over 4,000 Haitians were processed by the
INS. In order to accelerate the processing of Haitian asylum
claims, the INS shortened the time within which Haitians could
submit asylum claims. The INS also scheduled mass hearings to
consider the claims. As a result, Haitians were disabled from
fully presenting their claims. The court concluded that the record
amply sustained the plaintiffs' charge that in processing their asy-
lum claims the INS had violated the Constitution, the immigra-
tion statutes, international agreements, INS regulations, and INS
operating procedures. The district court ordered the INS to sub-
mit for court approval "a detailed plan providing for the orderly,
case-by-case, nondiscriminatory and procedurally fair reproces-
sing of the plaintiffs' asylum applications upon a full record which
will permit meaningful judicial review."77 In addition, the defend-
ants were enjoined from expelling or deporting any member of
the plaintiff class and from further processing applications until
the reprocessing plan has been approved.
In Mir v. Wilkinson,7 8 the first case to arise out of the detention
of recently arrived Cuban refugees, the District Court for Kansas
ordered that detained Cubans be given exclusion hearings within
sixty days of the court's decision. The case was initiated by seven
Cuban nationals who, after admitting to convictions for robbery
and burglary in Cuba, were detained pending exclusion hear-
ings. 79 The Cubans challenged their detention on three
76. No. 79-2086-Civ. (S.D. Fla. decided July 2, 1980), digested in 57 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 325 (1980).
77. Id.
78. No. 80-3139 through 3145, (D. Kan. decided September 2, 1980), digested in
57 INTERPRETER RELEASES 431 (1980).
79. Immigration officers determined that petitioners were likely to be denied
admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1976) which requires the exclusion of any appli-
cant who has recently been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The
crimes of theft, burglary, and robbery are crimes involving moral turpitude under
§ 1182 (a) (9). Mir v. Wilkinson, No. 80-3139 through 3145, slip op. at 7 (D. Kan. de-
cided September 2, 1980).
grounds.8 0 First, they claimed that imprisonment without oppor-
tunity to post bail offended the eighth amendment. Second, they
claimed they were being held without legal authority because
they had not been convicted of a crime in the United States. Fi-
nally, they claimed that their imprisonment was unlawful because
hearings had not been held within a reasonable time.
The court held that the petitioners had no statutory or constitu-
tional right to release on bail.81 In addition, the petitioners failed
to show that the attorney general had abused his discretion in de-
nying parole under section 212(d) (5) of the INA.82 The court fur-
ther held that detention of petitioners pending adjudication of
their admissibility was expressly authorized by Congress.8 3 The
court agreed with the petitioners, however, that detention of
unadniitted aliens may be rendered unlawful by unreasonable de-
lay in starting exclusion hearings.84 Here, the court found that
detention of the Cuban refugees was not yet unreasonable but
that it would become unreasonable if continued for another sixty
days.85 Therefore, the INS was ordered to conclude exclusion
hearings for petitioners within that time period.86
REQUIREMENT FOR MAINTENANCE OF STATUS FOR NONIMIGRANT
STUDENTS FROM IRAN
In response to Iran's unlawful seizure of the American Em-
bassy and the taking of hostages in Tehran, on November 10, 1979,
President Carter ordered the attorney general to identify Iranian
students in the United States who were not maintaining proper
status and to begin deportation proceedings against such per-
sons.8 7 On November 13, 1979, in response to that directive, the
attorney general88 amended the Code of Federal Regulations to
add section 214.5.89 The new regulation directed Iranian nonimni-
80. Id., slip op. at 8.
81. Id.
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d) (5) (1976); see Mir v. Wilkinson, No. 80-3139 through 3145,
slip op. at 10 (D. Kan. decided September 2, 1980).
83. Mir v. Wilkinson, No. 80-3139 through 3145, slip op. at 10 (D. Kan. decided
September 2, 1980).
84. Id., slip op. at 12.
85. Id., slip op. at 16.
86. Id.
87. Announcement on Actions to be Taken by the Department of Justice, 15
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 2107, 2107 (Nov. 10, 1979).
88. Broad authority is conferred upon the attorney general by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a) (1976) which provides that he shall "establish such regulations... and
perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority
under the provisions of [the Immigration Act]." In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)
(1976) gives the attorney general power to prescribe regulations under which non-
immigrants may be admitted and allowed to stay in the United States.
89. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1980).
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grant postsecondary students to report to the INS by December
14, 1979, with evidence of their residence and student status.90
Failure to comply or willfully supplying false information would
subject such students to immediate deportation proceedings. 91
The last section of the rule reminded students that a condition of
their admission and continuation of stay in the United States is
obedience to all laws of the United States.92 In light of the inter-
national crisis created by the events in Iran, the notice and com-
ment and delayed effective date provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act93 were waived by the attorney general as being im-
practicable and contrary to the public interest. The regulation
went into effect on November 13, 1979.94
Within a month, however, the rule was invalidated by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
Narenji v. Civiletti.95 In Narenji, plaintiffs challenged the regula-
tion as a violation of the fifth amendment because it discrimi-
nated against Iranian students on the basis of national origin.9 6
Plaintiffs also maintained that it violated the fourth amendment
by permitting INS officials to seize and interrogate Iranian stu-
dents without reasonable grounds to suspect that nonimmigrant
90. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5(a) (1980) specifically requires that at the time of reporting,
the student must provide the following- (1) passport and form 1-94 (arrival and de-
parture record); (2) evidence from the school of enrollment, including documenta-
tion showing payment of fees or waiver of payment of fees for the current
semester; (3) a letter from school authorities that shows the number of course
hours in which he or she is enrolled; and (4) evidence of his or her current ad-
dress in the United States.
91. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5(b) (1980). Section 241(a) (9) of the Immigration Act pro-
vides for the deportation of any alien who "xvas admitted as a nonimmigrant and
failed... to comply with the conditions of any such status." Immigration & Na-
tionality Act § 241(a) (9), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (9) (1976) [hereinafter cited as I. & N.
Act].
92. 8 C.F.R. § 214.5(c) (1980). This section refers to laws which prohibit the
commission of crimes of violence and for which a sentence of more than one year
imprisonment may be imposed. Id.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
94. 44 Fed. Reg. 65,728 (1979).
95. 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980). The cases of Narenji v. Civiletti, Civ. No. 79-3189
(D.D.C. fied Nov. 21, 1979), and Confederation of Iranian Students v. Civiletti, Civ.
No. 79-3210 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 27, 1979) were consolidated on November 27, 1979
with a full hearing on the merits held December 4, 1979. The former was filed as a
class action by three nonimmigrant students from Iran on behalf of all Iranians
admitted to the United States as nonimmigrant students. Their motion for class
certification was granted. The latter was filed by an association composed of ap-
proximately 1500 members.
96. 481 F. Supp. at 1136.
status was violated.97 In addition, they claimed it violated their
first amendment rights of speech, association and assembly.98 Fi-
nally, they claimed the notice and comment procedure of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act was not complied with and was
improperly waived.99
The court rejected the plaintiffs' challenge to the regulation
based on failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure
Act, concluding that the rationale stated in the published regula-
tion showed good cause for the waiver.100 Also rejected was the
plaintiffs' challenge to the specific requirements' 0 ' of the regula-
tion.102 The court indicated that the specific provisions were
within the latitude of the Executive under section 1184(a).103 But
the court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the regulation
was founded upon a classification based on national origin.l04
Finding no compelling national interest to justify the discrimina-
tory regulation, the court held that the regulation denied plaintiffs
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fifth amend-
ment. 05 Having found the regulation invalid under the fifth
amendment, it was unnecessary for the court to reach the first
and fourth amendment issues. 0 6 The judgment enjoined the gov-
ernment from enforcing the regulation, 07 from continuing any de-
portation proceedings already instituted against Iranian students
as a result of their compliance with the regulation, 08 and from us-
ing any information gathered from the Iranian students who re-
ported to the INS under the new regulation in any proceedings
under the immigration laws that might result in deportation or
any other penalty. 0 9
On December 14, 1979, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit granted the government's motion for a stay of
the district court judgment pending appeal."10 The stay was




100. Id. at 1137.
101. See note 90 supra.
102. 481 F. Supp. at 1137-38.
103. Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a) (1976) gives the attorney general power "to insure
that.. ; upon failure to maintain the status under which he was admitted...
such alien will depart from the United States."
104. 481 F. Supp. at 1138-45.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1147.
107. Id. at 1146.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2460 (D.C. Cir. December 14, 1979).
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ney general would extend the reporting deadline to December 29,
1979, and not enforce any deportation orders resulting from inter-
views until litigation was resolved."' On December 17, 1979, the
attorney general signed an amendment to the regulation ex-
tending the reporting deadline to December 31, 1979.112
On December 27, 1979, the court of appeals reversed the district
court.113 The circuit court's decision was based in part on the
broad authority conferred upon the attorney general by section
103(a) of the INA,114 and the specific authority conferred by sec-
tion 263(a).1 5 It was also based on case law supporting distinc-
tions on the basis of nationality in the field of immigration by the
Congress or the Executive so long as the distinctions are not
wholly irrational.1 6 The court indicated that classifications
among aliens based upon nationality are consistent with due pro-
cess and equal protection if supported by a rational basis. The
court was satisfied that that requirement was met here.117 The
court also emphasized the finding that the regulation was directly
related to the crisis in Iran, and thus was in the field of foreign
affairs, an area over which the President has constitutional au-
thority.118
On January 31, 1980, the court of appeals denied plaintiffs' mo-
tion for rehearing en banc.119 A few months later, on May 19, 1980,
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.120
STUDENT REGULATIONS
Events of the past year have focused attention upon nonimmi-
grant students12' and caused the INS to reconsider its position on
111. See supplementary information to 44 Fed. Reg. 75,165-6 (1979).
112. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,165 (1979).
113. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2928
(1980).
114. L & N. Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976), gives the attorney general au-
thority to "establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he
deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions" of the INA.
115. .& N. Act § 263(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976), gives the attorney general au-
thority "to prescribe special regulations and forms for the registration of finger-
printing of... (5) aliens of any other class not lawfully admitted to the United
States for permanent residence."
116. Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
2928 (1980).
117. Id. at 748.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 745.
120. 100 S. Ct. 2928 (1980).
121. The takeover of the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran, initiated official
121
the new student regulations that went into effect on January 1,
1979.122 The new regulations provide for the admission of nonim-
migrant students for the duration of their student status rather
than for a fixed period of time, and they' 23 also govern student
employment.124 It was hoped that these regulations would help to
ease the administrative burden on both the INS and nonimmi-
grant students,125 but the INS now believes that more effective
controls must be placed on nonimmigrant students.126 Accord-
ingly, the INS has proposed amendments to the regulations to en-
able it to ensure that nonimmigrant students are maintaining the
proper status. Under the proposed amendments, students will be
admitted for a fixed period of time with the opportunity to apply
for extensions. 127 In addition, periodic personal interviews by
INS personnel will be required of students to determine if they
are maintaining student status. 2 8 Central files will be maintained
on each student, as opposed to the present practice of maintain-
ing such files locally.129
LABOR CERTIFICATION AND EMPLOYMENT
Recent activity in the area of labor certification and employ-
ment includes both proposed legislation and judicial and adminis-
trative decisions. In 1979, the INS proposed new rules for
employment authorizations for certain aliens.130 Due to numer-
ous comments relating to those proposals, however, they never
became final and the INS published revised proposed rules. The
revised proposed rules -create a new section 109 to be added to Ti-
tle 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations.131 The new section enu-
merates the classes of aliens who do not need specific
authorization to be employed and sets forth classes of aliens who
may apply to the District Director for employment authorization.
inquiries into the number and whereabouts of foreign students in the United
States. In addition, violent activities on the part of some foreign students has
caused concern that the INS lacks effective control over students. See 57 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 85 (1980).
122. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,618 (1979).
123. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f) (2) (1979).
124. Id. § 214.2(f) (6).
125. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,618 (1979).




130. See 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 354, 361-62 (1979) for a summary of the origi-
nal proposed rules.
131. 45 Fed. Reg. 19,563 (1980).
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Decisions by the District Director are final and unappealable
under the proposed regulation. In addition, the new section sets
forth the grounds and procedures for revocation of employment
authorization.
Three recent decisions are of particular importance in this area.
In Stewart Infra-Red Commissary v. Coomey,13 2 the District Court
for Massachusetts ruled that labor certification decisions lie ex-
clusively with the Department of Labor and cannot be invalidated
by the INS. Thus, the INS had exceeded its statutory authority in
denying a sixth preference visa petition on the ground that the
alien was not qualified for the position for which the Department
of Labor had certified her.133 The court indicated, however, that
an alien's willful misrepresentation of facts to the Department of
Labor or INS may provide a basis for rejection of a visa peti-
tion.13 4
The other two decisions involved aliens who sought to obtain
exemptions from the labor certification requirement by obtaining
investor status under 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4).135 The first case, Pis-
tentis v. INS,136 involved an alien who purchased a dairy bar and
grocery store for $10,000 and thereafter sought investor status.137
His request was denied by the District Director when it was
learned that the investment had been made by giving the seller
the proceeds of a $5,000 bank loan and a promissory note in the
sum of $5,000.138 After later conceding his deportability, the alien
resubmitted his application for adjustment of status to permanent
resident with investor status. Once again it was denied. Since
the alien conducted the business himself and employed no one,
the immigration judge and the BIA concluded that the alien had
not satisfied the requirements for investor status set forth in In re
Ruangswang,139 a case decided six months after the alien filed
132. 485 F. Supp. 345 (D. Mass. 1980).
133. Id. at 346-47.
134. Id. at 347.
135. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) (1980).
136. 611 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1979).
137. On June 18, 1976 when Pistentis applied for investor status, 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.8(b) (4) required that an alien make an investment totaling $10,000. On Sep-
tember 7, 1976 the regulation was amended to require an investment of $40,000. Id.
at 484, 487.
138. Id. at 485.
139. I.D. No. 2546 (1976). In re Ruangswang held that an investment must ex-
pand job opportunities for United States citizens and lawful permanent residents.
his petition.140 The Third Circuit disagreed with this conclusion
and relied on In re Ko141 in holding that any request for labor cer-
tification exemption as an investor may be decided under either
current or previous law, whichever is more favorable to the
alien.142 Since it appeared that the requirements for investor sta-
tus in force at the time the alien filed his petition were more
favorable than those existing thereafter, the case was re-
manded.143 The Third Circuit also remanded on the issue of
whether the alien had established a sufficient $10,000 invest-
ment. 44
In the second case, Sanghavi v. INS,145 an alien was unsuccess-
ful in establishing investor status because the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals was not convinced that the alien had invested or was
actively in the process of investing capital totaling $10,000 as re-
quired by the investor regulation.146 The Fifth Circuit held that
the alien had not met his burden of showing the investment be-
cause it was unclear as to whether the proceeds of an $8,000 loan
were used to finance a one-time purchase of furniture for sale as
opposed to a permanent investment in inventory.147 Neverthe-
less, the court indicated that the fact $10,000 was not invested at
the date of application for investor status was not determina-
tive.14 An alien may qualify for investor status if he is actively in
the process of investing, which means that he must have actual
intent to invest the funds and be pursuing a plan of investment. 49
Although there was evidence to suggest that the alien added suffi-
cient capital within two years of his application for investor sta-
tus, the court held that the alien had not carried his burden of
proof.150
Two administrative decisions are also significant. In In re
Kumar,151 an alien who failed to qualify for investor status under
the old investor regulation tried to have a different investment,
140. 611 F.2d at 485.
141. 14 L & N. Dec. 349 (1973). The precept from In re Ko applies to case law
precedent as well as to the investor regulation itself. 611 F.2d at 487.
142. 611 F.2d at 487-88.
143. Id. at 488.
144. Id.
145. 614 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
146. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) (1976).




151. LD. No. 2777 (1980). On September 7, 1976, 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b) (4) was re-
vised to require that: (1) an alien invest $40,000 in an enterprise in the United
States of which he will be a principal manager; and (2) the enterprise must em-
ploy a person or persons who are United States citizens or aliens admitted as law-
ful permanent residents, exclusive of the alien, his spouse and children.
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made after the regulation was revised, analyzed under the more
lenient standard set forth in the earlier regulation. The BIA held
that an alien has no lingering right to have an investment made
after the regulatory change reviewed under pre-regulatory change
standards when the initial application never satisfied the earlier
standards. 52
In another investor exemption case, In re Lett,153 the BIA held
that the management of an investment by an alien qualified as an
investor does not constitute employment within the meaning of
section 212(a) (14) of the INA.'54 Therefore, such an alien would
not be precluded from adjusting his status under section 245
(c) (2) of the INA.155 An alien who fails to obtain an investor ex-
emption, however, runs the risk that work performed in connec-
tion with his investment may be considered unauthorized
employment and prevent adjustment of status under section
245(c) (2) of the INA.156
RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS OF ALIENS TO SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY
INCoME (SSI) BENEFITS
On June 9, 1980, the Social Security Act was amended, placing
new eligibility restrictions on aliens who apply for SSI benefits
for the first time after September 30, 1980.157 Under the new law,
for purposes of determining eligibility and the amount of benefits
for an alien, the income and resources of any person who exe-
cuted an affidavit of support or similar agreement on behalf of the
alien shall be deemed to be the income and resources of the
alien.' 58 This attribution of the sponsor's income and resources to
the alien operates only if the alien applies for SSI benefits within
three years of his entry into the United States.159 When the alien
resides with his sponsor, an exception to the attribution of in-
come rule is applied. 60
152. LD. No. 2777 at 4 (1980).
153. LD. No. 2776 (1980).
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (14) (1976).
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c) (2) (1976).
156. Id.
157. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-265, § 504(a),
94 Stat. 441 (1980). Section 504(a) amends § 1614(f) of the Social Security Act.
158. Id. In addition, the income and resources of the sponsor's spouse shall be
deemed to be the income and resources of the alien.
159. Id. § 504(b).
160. Id.
In order to have his eligibility considered, an alien is required
to obtain the cooperation of his sponsor in providing the neces-
sary information and evidence to enable the Social Security Ad-
ministration to make its decision. 161 The new law holds the alien
and sponsor jointly and severally liable for the repayment of any
SSI benefits incorrectly paid due to misinformation.162
The provisions of the new law do not apply to an alien who be-
comes blind or disabled after entry into the United States.163
They also do not apply to aliens admitted as refugees or granted
political asylum by the attorney general.164
FAMILY RELATIONS
Validity of Marriage
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered an important deci-
sion involving marriage validity in Dabaghian v. Civiletti.165 Fol-
lowing the trend of a number of its recent decisions,16 6 the Ninth
Circuit held that where a valid marriage is entered into in good
faith and is still legally binding, the marriage may support a
spouse's visa petition and eligibility for adjustment of status
under section 245 of the INA,167 even though the couple is sepa-
rated at the time of adjustment of status.
Dabaghian involved a nonimmigrant student who married a
United States citizen and applied for adjustment of status to per-
manent resident under section 245 of the INA. Two weeks after
his adjustment of status was granted, he filed for a divorce from
his wife and it was granted. Thereafter, the INS brought proceed-
ings to rescind the adjustment of status on the basis that at the
time it was granted, the marriage was "factually dead." According
to the INS, the alien was not the spouse of a United States citizen
pursuant to section 201(b) of the INA.168 The immigration judge
ordered rescission and the BIA dismissed the alien's appeal.
Later, his action for review and relief in the district court was dis-
missed on summary judgment. 6 9





165. 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979).
166. See Menezes v. INS, 601 F.2d 1028 (9th Cir. 1979); Whetstone v. INS, 561
F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977); Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Chan v.
Bell, 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978).
167. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255 (West Supp. 1980).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976).
169. 607 F.2d at 869.
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to enter a judgment directing the INS to reinstate appellant's per-
manent residence. 70 The Ninth Circuit held that since at the
time of adjustment appellant was a spouse in a legally valid mar-
riage which was not sham or fraudulent at its inception, he was
eligible for adjustment of status and his permanent resident sta-
tus could not be rescinded.'7z The fact that his marriage was fac-
tually dead at the time of adjustment was of no importance.
In re McKee,l72 a BIA decision subsequent to Dabaghian relied
on Chan v. BellI73 in holding that, where parties enter into a valid
marriage and there is nothing to show that they have since ob-
tained a legal separation or dissolution, a visa petition filed on be-
half of the alien spouse should not be denied solely because the
parties are separated. The Board went on to hold, however, that
separation is a relevant factor in determining whether the mar-
riage was a sham at the time it was entered into.174
The definition of spouse was also the issue in Adams v. Hower-
ton17 where two males, one an alien and the other a United
States citizen, married one another in Colorado and later sought a
declaration granting immediate relative status on behalf of the
alien. The district court denied the declaration, holding that
neither Colorado nor federal law recognizes the marriage of per-
sons of the same sex. 7 6 In addition, the court held that the denial
of immediate relative status to the alien did not constitute a de-
nial of constitutional rights under the equal protection and due
process clauses.177
170. Id. at 871.
171. Id. In In re Kondo, I.D. No. 2781 (1980), a recent decision by the BIA, the
Board followed Dabaghian and held that a marriage legally valid but "factually
dead" (nonviable) at the time of the adjustment of status cannot be the basis for
rescission for cases arising in the Ninth Circuit. In so holding, the Board over-
ruled its earlier decision in In re Sosa, I.D. No. 2469 (1976) indicating that it no
longer applies in the Ninth Circuit.
172. LD. No. 2782 (1980). The McKee case, which was decided after In re
Kondo, I.D. No. 2781 (1980), discussed in note 171 supra, may have an effect on
whether Kondo will be limited to the Ninth Circuit.
173. 464 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1978). See Synopsis, Recent Developments in the
Immigration Laws of the United States 1978-1979, 17 SAN DIEGO L REV. 173, 189
(1979).
174. I.D. No. 2782 at 4.
175. 486 F. Supp. 1119 (1980).
176. Id. at 1122-23.
177. Id. at 1124-25.
Visa Petitions for Family Members
In an unusual visa petition case, In re Fong,178 a natural child of
his father's second wife was successful in persuading the BIA to
acknowledge the child's eligibility to obtain a visa petition for his
father's first wife as his stepmother. The Board's decision was
based on two factors. First, the father's marriage to the first wife
could not be considered polygamous because the father was mar-
ried to no one else at the time. 7 9 Second, the Board found au-
thority for treating the father's first wife as petitioner's
stepmother.180 Moreover, the Board held that the fact petitioner
had already successfully petitioned for his natural mother did not
preclude approval of a visa petition for his stepmother.'8 '
In In re Moreira,182 also referred to as "Moreira II," the BIA ex-
panded its earlier decision involving steprelationships. In its ear-
lier decision, 8 3 the Board rejected the "close family unit"
requirement for steprelationships, but held that more than a
purely technical relationship was needed to establish a relation-
ship that would qualify for immigration purposes. 84 The Board
further held that a steprelationship could be established by show-
ing that the stepparent had, prior to the child's eighteenth birth-
day, evinced an active concern for the stepchild's support,
instruction and general welfare.185 Since the marriage in Moreira
took place only four months prior to the child's eighteenth birth-
day, it was impossible to prove the steprelationship under the cri-
teria set forth in the first Moreira decision. Therefore, in the
second Moreira decision, the Board held that inquiry may prop-
erly be made into what occurred between the stepparent and
stepchild before the marriage, or after the child reached the age
of eighteen, in order to determine if the standards set forth in the
178. I.D. No. 2749 (1980).
179. Id. at 3.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 3.
182. I.D. No. 2792 (1980). The section of the INA interpreted in both Moreira
decisions was § 101(b) (1) (B), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b) (1) (B) (1976) which includes the fol-
lowing within the definition of the term "child": "a stepchild, whether or not born
out of wedlock, provided the child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the
time the marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred. .. ."
183. In re Moreira, LD. No. 2720 (1979). After declining this case, the Board re-
manded it to the district court to determine whether a steprelationship existed
under its precedent decision. The Board also ordered that the case be certified
back to the Board if the district court's decision was adverse to petitioner. The
district court's decision was adverse, so the case was returned to the Board. For a
more detailed discussion of the first Moreira decision see Synopsis, Recent Devel-
opments in the Immigration Laws of the United States 1978-1979, 17 SAN DiEGO L
REV. 173, 187 (1979).
184. LD. No. 2720 at 5.
185. Id. at 7, 9.
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earlier decision have been met.186
In an interesting decision, In re Gonzalez,187 the BIA relied on
the first Moreira188 decision in approving a visa petition on behalf
of petitioner's stepbrother even though the stepbrother was the
son of a woman petitioner's father never married. The peti-
tioner's father was unable to act as common parent in this case
because the son was not legitimated.189 However, since peti-
tioner's natural mother had shown the active parental concern for
the beneficiary required by Moreira, the Board found a steppar-
ent relationship between petitioner's mother and her step-
brother.19 0 Petitioner's mother thus served as the common parent
of petitioner and her stepbrother, qualifying them as siblings.191
Both the "close family unit"'192 and Moreira193 standards for de-
termining the existence of a steprelationship in granting visa pref-
erences were recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Palmer v. Reddy.194 Relying on precedents predating
Moreira,195 the Palmer court interpreted "stepchild" literally and
held that visa preferences are available to stepchildren without
qualification.19.6
VISA ALLOCATION
The controversy surrounding the allocation of recaptured visa
numbers improperly charged against the Western Hemisphere
immigration quota 97 during the adjustment of status of Cuban
refugees between 1968 and 1976198 has been settled by the Sev-
186. I.D. No. 2792 at 3-4 (1980).
187. I.D. No. 2754 (1980).
188. I.D. No. 2720 (1979).
189. I.D. No. 2754 at 2 (1980).
190. Id. at 3.
191. Id.
192. See In re Moreira, ID. No. 2720 at 3-6 (1979).
193. I.D. No. 2720 (1979).
194. 622 F.2d 463, 464 (9th Cir. 1980).
195. See Hyppolite v. Sweeny, No. 77-1865-Civ. (S.D. Fla., filed Jan. 6, 1979); An-
drade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp.
531 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
196. 622 F.2d at 464.
197. A numerical limitation on Western Hemisphere immigrants of 110,000 per
fiscal year became effective on July 1, 1968. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236,
§ 21(e), 79 Stat. 911.
198. Cuban Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966). By this
Act, Congress granted the attorney general authority to adjust the status of any
Cuban native or citizen who had been lawfully physically present in the United
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Silva v. Bell.199 The decision re-
versed the judgment of the district court as to the formula
governing the allocation of recaptured visa numbers and re-
manded the matter to the district court for a new computation
under a revised formula.200
The Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' proposal to assign
the recaptured visa numbers in strict chronological order by pri-
ority date without regard to national origin.20 Instead, the court
adopted a modified version of the defendants' "historical ap-
proach."202 The historical approach provides three criteria for the
issuance of recaptured visas. First, a determination must be
made as to how many visa numbers were charged to Cuban ad-
justees in each of the relevant fiscal years. Second, a determina-
tion must be made as to what percentage of the properly issued
visa numbers was awarded to applicants from each of the West-
ern Hemisphere nations in each of the relevant fiscal years.
Third, the visa numbers recaptured from each year must be is-
sued so that they are apportioned among plaintiff class members
from each nation in the same percentage that immigrants from
that nation received properly issued visa numbers in that fiscal
year.2 03
The first modification to this approach is that visa numbers al-
ready issued pursuant to the unauthorized recapture program are
to be credited against each country's total historical share.20 4 The
second modification is directed at expediting the recapture and al-
location procedure. Instead of setting up separate and sequential
allocations for each of the eight fiscal years involved since 1968,
the historical share of each country over the entire eight year pe-
riod is aggregated. 205 In addition, historical share visa numbers
which are unused shall be redistributed to countries with quail-
States for at least two years to that of permanent resident alien. However, the Act
did not address the issue of whether the Cuban "adjustees" were to be charged
against the Western Hemisphere quota. Therefore, between July 1, 1968 and 1976,
the INS charged Cubans against the quota. The Justice Department's Office of Le-
gal Counsel later concluded in a memorandum that the Cuban "adjustees" were
not to be charged against the Western Hemisphere quota. Thereafter, on August
31, 1976, the attorney general ordered the INS to stop charging the adjustees
against the quota. See Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978, 981 (7th Cir. 1979).
199. 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 988.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 983.
204. Id. at 988. This modification was necessary because by August of 1977 de-
fendants had taken it upon themselves to recapture and reissue many of the
wrongfully issued visa numbers without court permission. Id. at 982.
205. Id. at 989.
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fled visa demand in excess of their historical shares. 20 6 Finally,
the Seventh Circuit ordered that the entire recapture program be
completed within two years of entry of the order of the district
court on remand.207
Another recent case, Contreras de Avila v. Bell,208 also involved
a dispute over the allocation of visas. The dispute arose after an
amendment to the Immigration and Nationality Act on October
20, 1976, imposed a preference system and a 20,000 limit on visa
numbers which could be issued for each country under the West-
ern Hemisphere quota of 120,000.209 The new law went into effect
on January 1, 1977, three months after the fiscal year had begun.
By January of 1977, 14,203 visas had already been issued to Mexi-
can immigrants. The visa office concluded that the visas which
had been issued to Mexican immigrants up to January, 1977
should be charged to the 20,000 quota, thus leaving only 5,797 visa
numbers for the balance of the fiscal year.
In response to that decision, plaintiffs brought a class action
against the State Department seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The complaint asserted that the defendants had improp-
erly charged the visa numbers to the 20,000 quota and sought the
recapture of 13,336 visas which allegedly would have been avail-
able to Mexican natives. 210 Plaintiffs sought certification of three
classes. Only two of the classes, however, were certified.2 11 The
two subclasses consisted of all current preference applicants and
nonpreference applicants as of October 1, 1977.
The district court concluded that the State Department's inter-
pretation of the new law was unreasonable and contrary to con-
gressional intent. First, the visas issued in the first three months
of the fiscal year were not issued pursuant to the preference sys-
tem as required by the new law. Moreover, Congress did not in-
tend the new law to apply retroactively. But the court would not
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. No. 78 C 1166 (N.D. Ill., filed May 18, 1979), digested in 56 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 342 (1979).
209. Act of Oct. 20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703.
210. No. 78 C 1166 (N.D. Ill., filed May 18, 1979), digested in 56 INTERPRETER RE-
LEASES 342 (1979).
211. Id. The third class sought to be classified consisted of permanent resi-
dents or United States citizens on whose visa petitions the plaintiffs in class one
received their preference classifications and priority dates. The third class was
combined with the first class for certification.
accept the argument that the full 20,000 limit was to apply to the
remaining nine months of the fiscal year. Instead, the court held
that a reasonable approach was to prorate the 20,000 quota so that
15,000 visa numbers would be available for the remainder of the
year. Because 5,435 visas had been issued subsequent to January
1, 1977, a total of 9,565 visas remained to be used. The court held
that those visas should be distributed to the two certified sub-
classes. The district court's entire order is currently on appeal to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
DEPORTATION AND IMMIGRATION PROCEDURE
Suspension of Deportation
Of the many cases which have been decided in the area of sus-
pension of deportation under section 244(a) (1) of the INA,212 a
few are particularly significant. In Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS,213
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated an order of the BIA
denying eligibility for suspension of deportation to an alien who,
due to a one month absence from the United States five years
prior to his application for suspension, failed to satisfy the re-
quirement of "continuous seven years physical presence" preced-
ing the date of application.214
The petitioner in Kamheangpatiyooth was a native and citizen
of Thailand who was allowed to enter and remain in the United
States as a student from 1964 to 1976.215 Approximately midway
through his twelve-year presence in this country, he took a one
month trip to Thailand to visit his dying mother.216 The trip was
scheduled between semesters so that petitioner would not miss
school.217 When petitioner was found deportable for failure to de-
part on schedule, he applied for suspension of deportation.
The immigration judge purported to apply a "Fleuti test"218 to
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976). This section permits the attorney general to con-
sider the merits of an application for suspension of deportation if the alien makes
a prima facie showing that he satisfies the following requirements:
[He] has been physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of
such application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a
person of good moral character; and is a person whose deportation would,
in the opinion of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the
alien or to the spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.
Id. (emphasis added).
213. 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979).
214. See note 212 supra.
215. 597 F.2d at 1255.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The threshold question in determining whether an alien is subject to one
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evaluate the significance of petitioner's absence.219 The following
factors were considered: the length of the visit, the purposes
thereof, and documentation necessary to make the trip.220 After
considering these factors, the judge concluded that the trip broke
the continuity of petitioner's physical presence because the dis-
tance traveled was great, the length of the visit was thirty days,
and travel documents were obtained.221 The BIA affirmed the im-
migration judge's decision to deny suspension of deportation.222
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the immigration judge and
stated that the Fleuti factors had been applied as if "they were in
themselves determinative both of the meaning of 'intended' de-
parture in Section 101(a) (13) and of the meaning of a 'continuous
period' of presence in Section 244(a) (1)."223 The Ninth Circuit
proposed instead that the significance of the absence be analyzed
in terms of the statutory requirement of a continuous seven-year
waiting period.224 As viewed by the Ninth Circuit, the purpose of
that requirement was to guarantee the "legitimacy of the infer-
ence that extended presence was likely to make deportation
harsh."225 An absence cannot be considered interruptive of the
of the many exclusions to admissibility to the United States set forth in § 212 of
the INA is whether the alien made an "entry" as defined in § 101(a) (13) of the
INA. In Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
gave an expansive interpretation to the definition of "entry." In Fleuti, the Court
held that an "innocent, casual and brief" trip outside the United States was not an
intended departure and therefore did not meaningfully interrupt the alien's per-
manent residence. Thus, such an alien was not subject to an "entry" upon re-
turning to the United States; and further, the alien was not subject to exclusion.
In Fleuti, the Court identified three factors which are important in determining
whether an alien's departure was intended and therefore meaningfully interrup-
tive of his permanent residence. These factors are: the length of the absence; the
purpose of the trip; and the casual nature of the trip.
In Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964), the Ninth Circuit held that the
guidelines set forth in Fleuti for purposes of determining an entry in the exclusion
context could be used in determining whether there had been continuity of physi-
cal presence for purposes of granting suspension of deportation. Apparently, the
immigration judge relied on Wadman in applying the Fleuti test to Kamheangpa-
tiyooth.




223. Id.; see note 218 supra.
224. Id. The court held that the Fleuti factors were relevant, but not conclusive
on the issue of continuity of presence. They had to be considered in light of the
circumstances of the case and congressional purposes behind the suspension of
deportation statute. Id.
225. Id. at 1256.
period of presence if the hardship to the alien would be the same
with or without the absence.226 In that context, the Ninth Circuit
found nothing in the circumstances of petitioner's thirty day trip
to Thailand to detract from the inference, appropriate from the
length and nature of his twelve-year presence in the United
States, that deportation would present a great hardship.227 The
Ninth Circuit further stated that the fact petitioner obtained
travel documents was additional evidence of the temporary na-
ture of his absence, and it did nothing to diminish the likelihood
that petitioner had established roots in this country which would
have made deportation harsh.228 The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case for reconsideration of the continuous presence requirement
and for a determination of petitioner's good moral character and
hardship.22 9
In a later case, Chan v. INS,230 the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reaffirmed the principles set forth in Kamheangpatiyooth.
The Chan case involved a husband and wife who were natives of
Hong Kong and citizens of Great Britain. Both remained in the
United States past the time authorized by their student visas and
were ordered deported. Their applications for suspension were
denied by the immigration judge because they had separately
taken a number of vacations to Hong Kong, Canada and Australia,
thus breaking the continuity of their physical presence in the
United States.231 The Ninth Circuit held that the denial of their
applications was an abuse of discretion. The trips were not mean-
ingfully interruptive of their residence because the Chans were
absent separately; the sole purpose of the trips was to visit family
and friends; the trips were during school vacations; and they trav-
eled with passports they already had.232
The case also involved the issue of whether deportation was a
sufficient hardship to the Chans. Even though the Chans admit-
ted they would be able to find employment abroad, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the BIA had abused its discretion in not
considering fully the personal hardship on the Chans because
Mrs. Chan would be separated from her family and Mr. Chan's
ability to support his parents abroad would be diminished.233
226. Id. at 1257.
227. Id. at 1258.
228. Id. at 1259.
229. Id. at 1260.
230. 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979).
231. Id. at 653.
232. Id. at 655.
233. Id.
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In another suspension case, Tovar v. INS,234 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that an alien woman could qualify for sus-
pension of deportation on the basis of extreme hardship to her
grandson, who lived with her and was a United States citizen,
even though section 244 of the INA only provides for considera-
tion of hardship to the alien's "spouse, parent or child."235 Be-
cause the alien's relationship to her grandson resembled that of
parent to child, the court held that the hardship to the grandchild
from deportation of his grandmother should be considered in de-
termining whether the latter was eligible for a stay of deporta-
tion.236
A number of decisions interpreting the requirement of "ex-
treme hardship" were handed down in the past year. In Bastidas
v. INS,237 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a decision
of an immigration judge denying suspension of deportation based
on failure to establish extreme hardship. The Third Circuit held
that insufficient consideration had been given to the noneconomic
emotional hardship which would result from the alien's separa-
tion from his young son, a United States citizen.238 In so holding,
the Third Circuit confirmed the importance of the question of sep-
aration of family members from each other for purposes of a sec-
tion 244(a) (1) extreme hardship determination.239
Extreme hardship was also the issue in Wang v. INS.240 In
Wang, an order of deportation by the BIA would have required
two school age children, both United States citizens who spoke
only English, to accompany their alien parents to Korea. In ap-
plying for a motion to reopen deportation proceedings, petitioners
argued that their children would suffer serious economic, educa-
tional and cultural difficulties if forced to leave this country. In
addition, petitioners argued that they would suffer an economic
loss upon the sale of their home and business. After considering
the combined effects of the hardship to the children and the eco-
234. 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980).
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976); see note 212 supra.
236. 612 F.2d at 797.
237. 609 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1979).
238. Id. at 105. Petitioner was a native and citizen of Columbia who married a
U.S. citizen. After petitioner filed for a dissolution of their marriage, his wife with-
drew a visa petition she filed on his behalf and petitioner was ordered to leave the
U.S. Id. at 102.
239. Id.; see note 212 supra.
240. 622 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1980).
nomic loss to petitioners, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a
prima facie case of extreme hardship had been shown.241 The
case was remanded for more thorough consideration of both fac-
tors.
In another case involving children who were United States citi-
zens, Villena v. INS,242 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the BIA's denial of an alien's original application for
suspension when there was insufficient evidence of extreme hard-
ship to his two year old child whom a psychologist said could eas-
ily adjust to life in the Philippines.243 Moreover, there was
evidence that petitioner would not be deprived of employment in
the Philippines. 244 The circuit court, however, reversed the BIA's
decision denying petitioner's motion to reopen deportation pro-
ceedings because he had alleged new facts supporting his claim of
extreme hardship.245 The court acknowledged that since the new
factors arose after the determination that petitioner was deport-
able, they were entitled to less weight. In the aggregate, however,
these facts plus his previous allegations of hardship, combined
with the hardship and prejudice suffered by petitioner by reason
of the INS' delay in responding to his preference classification pe-
tition established a prima facie showing of extreme hardship.246
The Board's denial of the motion to reopen was reversed and the
case was remanded to determine whether petitioner was eligible
for suspension of deportation. 247
Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Proceedings
In In re Sandoval,248 a recent decision of importance, the BIA
concluded that evidence obtained illegally by immigration officials
241. Id. at 1349.
242. 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980).
243. Id. at 1358.
244. Id.
245. The new facts were: (1) hardship to petitioner's parents who were admit-
ted as lawful permanent residents and were residing with petitioner; (2) the birth
of another U.S. citizen child; (3) additional hardship to petitioner's children; (4)
petitioner purchased a home, (5) petitioner's wife was applying for suspension of
deportation; and (6) petitioner's brother had become a lawful permanent resident.
Id. at 1359, 1361.
246. Id. at 1361.
247. Id. As of this writing, two Ninth Circuit cases have been decided under
Wang and Villena. See Carnaila-Munoz v. INS, 80 Daily Journal D.A.R. 2646 (9th
Cir. 1980) (prima facie case not shown where there was only economic hardship to
the deportable aliens and no additional equities); Berrera-Leyva v. INS, 80 Daily
Journal D.A.R. 2653 (9th Cir. 1980) (Board abused its discretion in refusing to con-
sider economic hardship together with separation of family and other personal
hardships in determining whether petitioner had made a sufficient showing of ex-
treme hardship).
248. LD. No. 2725 (1979). Sandoval involved a female alien who, as a result of
an illegal search of an apartment building, was taken into custody. After being ad-
vised of her rights, she signed an affidavit admitting her alienage and illegal entry
136
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in violation of an alien's fourth amendment rights can be used as
a basis for a finding of deportability. In making its decision, the
Board found that the exclusionary rule was designed to deter law
enforcement officials from violating fourth amendment rights, but
the United States Supreme Court had never used it to exclude ev-
idence from a civil proceeding.249 Since deportation proceedings
have consistently been classified as civil rather than criminal, the
Board could find no reason to extend the fourth amendment ex-
clusionary rule to deportation proceedings.250 The Board rea-
soned that the internal safeguards against an immigration
officer's misconduct were sufficient, so the application of the ex-
clusionary rule would not provide a useful additional deterrent.251
Moreover, the "societal costs" posed by the application of the rule
outweighed any deterrent effect that the rule might provide.252
Thus, the Board held that neither legal nor policy considerations
militated in favor of the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence
from deportation proceedings.253
In a later decision, In re Garcia-Flores,254 the Board limited the
broad rule expressed in Sandoval. In Garcia-Flores an alien ar-
gued that evidence supporting a deportation charge against her as
an alien who had entered without inspection was inadmissible be-
cause a service officer had failed to advise her of her right to an
attorney pursuant to the federal regulations.255 The Board con-
cluded that a violation of the regulations may lead to a finding of
into the United States. She sought to have this evidence excluded as the product
of an illegal search and seizure. Id. at 3-5. For a critique of the decision, see Mail-
man, Fourth Amendment Suffers Setback Under Sandoval, 182 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1979), re-
printed in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 468 (1979).
249. I.D. No. 2725 at 8-9.
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 13, 16. The Board suggested that a better curb to the misconduct of
an immigration officer would be the filing of a formal complaint with the officer's
superior. Moreover, civil or criminal actions could be brought against the officer.
Id. at 15, 17.
252. Id. at 17. The "societal costs" referred to by the Board include: (1) diver-
sion of the Board's attention from the main issue; and (2) the suppression of evi-
dence would create a "windfall" effect in favor of the alien because insufficient
evidence of his deportability would result in his remaining in the United States.
Id. at 14-15.
253. Id. at 17.
254. I.D. No. 2780 (1980).
255. Id. at 2. The provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1980) mandate that an alien be
advised of his right to counsel.
inadmissibility.25 6 Adopting a test set forth in United States v.
Calderon-Medina,2 7 the Board held that, when a regulation is
designed to benefit an alien and its violation prejudices interests
of the alien protected by the regulation, evidence obtained pursu-
ant to the violation may be excluded.258 Here, the Board was sat-
isfied that the subject regulation was a benefit to the alien, but
the matter was remanded to determine whether the alien had ac-
tually been prejudiced.25 9
NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATION
In Olegario v. United States,260 the Second Circuit upheld exec-
utive action withdrawing the means by which Filipino veterans of
the United States armed forces during World War II could obtain
United States citizenship pursuant to special federal legisla-
tion.261 In so holding, the court reversed a decision of the district
court, which had granted a petition for naturalization to a Filipino
who had served in the United States armed forces during World
War II but had failed to fie a petition for naturalization before
December 31, 1946, when the special legislation expired.262
The controversy over Filipino veterans seeking United States
citizenship began when the attorney general withdrew naturaliza-
tion facilities from the Philippines between 1945 and 1946, after
the Philippine government expressed concern that it would lose
too many citizens to the United States. 2 63 As a result of this ac-
tion, many eligible Filipinos were disabled from obtaining United
States citizenship. In In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Vet-
erans,264 a group of Filipino war veterans successfully challenged
executive action removing naturalization facilities from the Phil-
lipines. The district court divided petitioners seeking citizenship
256. I.D. No. 2780 at 4.
257. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
258. I.D. No. 2780 at 5.
259. Id. at 6.
260. 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'g 473 F. Supp. 185 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
261. On March 27, 1942, Congress amended the Nationality Act of 1940 to pro-
vide for the naturalization of noncitizens who served in the United States armed
forces during World War If. The new law exempted noncitizen servicemen who
served outside the continental United States from some of the usual naturalization
requirements, such as a period of residence in this country and literacy in English.
It also provided for the overseas naturalization of persons eligible who were in ac-
tive service in the United States military and were not within the jurisdiction of
any court authorized to naturalize aliens. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-270,
§ 202(c) (1), 59 Stat. 658.
262. 629 F.2d at 211. The 1940 Act specified that all naturalization petitions filed
under § 701 had to be submitted by December 31, 1946. Act of Dec. 28, 1945, Pub. L.
No. 79-270, § 202(c) (1), 59 Stat. 658.
263. 629 F.2d at 209.
264. 406 F. Supp. 931 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
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into two categories. In the first were those who had taken affirma-
tive action to fie for naturalization before the statutory deadline,
but whose applications were rejected because of the INS policy
not to naturalize Filipinos. 265 As to these petitioners, the court
held that the rejection of applications amounted to affirmative
misconduct which estopped the INS from relying on the expira-
tion of the legislation.266 The second category was composed of
Filipino veterans who did not take timely steps to be naturalized
before the legislation expired.267 As to the category two petition-
ers, the court held that the deliberate failure to have INS facilities
available'was a denial of due process.268 Therefore, petitioners el-
igible for citizenship under the expired legislation were ordered
admitted to citizenship.269
Because the government conceded that the aliens in category
one were prejudiced by the government's failure to process their
applications, it did not oppose their petitions.2 70 However, the
government vigorously challenged the granting of citizenship to
Filipinos in category two who made no attempt to procure citizen-
ship before the expiration of the statute.271
The petitioner in Olegario fell into the second category. Al-
though qualified for the special legislation, Olegario made no at-
tempt to fie a petition for naturalization prior to the expiration of
the legislation. Nevertheless, relying on the 68 Veterans case, the
district court concluded that Olegario had been denied due pro-
cess of law in a manner which could only be remedied by admit-
ting him to citizenship.272 The Second Circuit conceded that
Olegario was entitled to claim the protection of the due process
clause at the time the naturalization examiner was withdrawn
from the Philippines. 273 The court, however, held that the Execu-
tive's action in removing the means by which Filipino servicemen
could become naturalized did not contravene Congress' intent in
passing the special legislation. Nor did it discriminate against a
265. Id. at 936.
266. Id. at 939.
267. Id. at 940.
268. Id. at 951.
269. Id.
270. 473 F. Supp. 185, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 629 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1980).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. 629 F.2d at 233.
certain class.27 4 The court held further that the withdrawal of the
naturalization examiner was within the Executive's broad discre-
tion in foreign affairs and did not exceed the authority granted to
the Commissioner of the INS and the attorney general to imple-
ment the INA.275 The court concluded by stating that the removal
of the examiner was justified by a sufficiently important federal
interest.276
In United States v. Banafshe,277 a recent case involving denatu-
ralization, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision
which revoked an alien's naturalization pursuant to section 340(d)
of the INA.278 Section 340(d) creates a rebuttable presumption of
fraud when a naturalized citizen sets up permanent residence in
his native land within five years after naturalization. Banafshe ar-
gued that the statutory presumption was unconstitutional be-
cause it eliminated the government's burden to prove its case by
clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence pursuant to Schneid-
erman v. United States.279 The Ninth Circuit concluded, however,
that the statute was a valid exercise of Congress' authority to en-
act rules of evidence and procedure.280 In reaching that conclu-
sion the Ninth Circuit relied on Luria v. United States,281 a case
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a predecessor statute. The court also relied on Vance
v. Terrazas282 which held that Congress is free to supplant the
courts' evidentiary standards because they are judge-made rules
that are not rooted in the Constitution.
Banafshe argued further that, even if the statute were constitu-
tional, he had presented sufficient evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption in that he returned to his native country after his father
became ill in order to assist in running a family business. 283 The
court, however, affimed the district court's finding that all of
Banafshe's activities in the native country indicated an intent to
remain there.284
CONCLUSION
As this synopsis indicates, a significant portion of the activity




277. 616 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1980).
278. 8 U.S.C. 1451(d) (1976).
279. 616 F.2d at 1146; see Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
280. 616 F.2d at 1146.
281. 231 U.S. 9 (1913).
282. 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
283. 616 F.2d at 1147.
284. Id.
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has concerned refugees and asylum. The government referred to
the June, 1980 influx of Cuban refugees as the "greatest overload"
on the immigration service system in INS history. Although it
was hoped that the Refugee and Asylum Act of 1980 would have
the potential to accommodate large influxes of aliens into the
United States, the President found it necessary to call for new
legislation to deal with the Haitians and Cubans.
Increasing the strain on the INS is the effort to deport Iranians
who are not fullfilling the requirements of their nonimmigrant
status. This effort has called attention to the degree of control ex-
ercised by the INS over nonimmigrants. In response to demon-
strations by foreign students, the government has proposed
changes to the liberalized student regulations that went into ef-
fect in January of 1980. The proposed changes will increase con-
trol over nonimmigrant students. This action reflects the INS'
continuing effort to balance the need to reduce the administrative
time and expense involved in processing immigration matters
against the need to maintain effective controls over aliens in the
United States.
The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, es-
tablished in 1978 to evaluate existing laws, policies and proce-
dures governing the admission of immigrants and refugees to the
United States, is now fully staffed and operational. The due date
for the Commission's final report of its findings and recommenda-
tions to the President and Congress has been extended to March
1, 1981. Whether the Commission's efforts will affect the course of
immigration and nationality law remains to be seen.
SusAN B. HALL

